Know which cloud risks lead somewhere, and fix those first
Every cloud estate produces more findings than anyone can fix. The ones that matter are combinations: a vulnerable workload that is also reachable from the internet, holding sensitive data, with a role that can reach the rest of the estate. We find those paths, evidence them, and close them with the teams who own the resources, while the work runs.
The estate is larger than the console shows
Cloud estates grow the way the business grows: an account for each product team, a subscription for each acquisition, a sandbox someone forgot, workloads running as virtual machines, containers, functions and appliances, and a pipeline that rebuilds all of it several times a day. Each console shows its own slice. Nobody holds the whole picture, and the tooling meant to help produces thousands of findings ranked by severity scores that know nothing about your environment. A critical vulnerability on an isolated test box outranks a medium one on the payment service that faces the internet with an over-privileged role. Teams triage by count, the backlog grows, and the finding that leads to a breach sits at position four hundred.
What usually brings people to this page
Most cloud security work starts with one of these. If two are true, it is already overdue.
Findings outnumber the people
Thousands of open items across posture, vulnerability and identity tools, ranked by generic severity, and no way to say which fifty matter.
Several clouds, several consoles
Accounts and subscriptions across providers, each with its own view, and nobody who can enumerate the estate end to end.
Permissions nobody designed
Roles and service identities accumulated over years, most with far more reach than the workload needs, and no review that ever cut them back.
An auditor or regulator asked
Frameworks now expect continuous evidence of cloud controls, and a quarterly spreadsheet no longer passes.
A peer was breached through the cloud
The board asks whether the same misconfiguration exists here, and the honest answer takes weeks to produce.
Delivery outran security
Teams ship infrastructure as code several times a day, and security reviews it after the fact, if at all.
Six things have to be true, in this order
1. Inventory
- Every account, subscription and project across every provider, connected by API rather than by installing software on each workload
- Every workload type in scope: virtual machines, containers and clusters, serverless functions, managed services and appliances
- Resources nobody owns surfaced and given an owner, because an orphaned resource cannot be fixed
2. Misconfiguration and vulnerabilities
- Configuration checked against a baseline that fits your workloads, from the storage bucket to the cluster
- Vulnerabilities found across every workload type, not only the servers an agent happened to be installed on
- Both caught in infrastructure code before deployment as well as in the running estate
3. Identity and permissions
- Every human and machine identity mapped to what it can reach, across accounts and providers
- Excess entitlements cut back to least privilege, with the policy generated from what the workload uses rather than what someone guessed
- Privileged paths reviewed on a rhythm, because permissions grow back
4. Data and exposure
- Sensitive data located inside the cloud estate: databases, buckets, snapshots and the copies nobody remembers making
- Internet exposure verified from outside rather than inferred from configuration
- The two combined, so a public resource holding regulated data is treated as what it is
5. Attack paths and priority
- Findings joined into paths: exposure, vulnerability, identity and data considered together rather than in separate queues
- Exploitability validated, so the list is what an attacker could do rather than what a scanner could see
- A short prioritised list leadership can fund and teams can finish
6. Remediation and detection
- Each fix routed to the team that owns the resource, with the steps written for them, rather than queued on the security team
- Guardrails in the pipeline so the same misconfiguration cannot be deployed twice
- Runtime detection on the workloads that matter, and reporting a board or an auditor will accept as evidence
Where we look
Where the estate runs
- Accounts, subscriptions and projects across the major providers, including the ones created for a project and left behind
- Virtual machines, containers, Kubernetes clusters, serverless functions and managed services
- Network exposure: load balancers, public endpoints and the storage that was made public to meet a deadline
Who and what can act
- Human identities and the federated access behind them
- Service accounts, roles, keys and tokens, including the ones embedded in code and images
- The trust relationships between accounts that let one compromise become several
What is being built
- Infrastructure as code and the templates teams copy from each other
- Container images and the registries they come from
- The deployment pipelines themselves, which hold credentials to everything they deploy
What is worth taking
- Databases, object storage and snapshots holding regulated or commercially sensitive data
- Secrets and credentials stored where a workload compromise would expose them
- Backups and replicas, which are as exposed as the originals and reviewed far less often
Severity scores know nothing about your estate
A vulnerability score describes the flaw. It says nothing about whether the workload is reachable, what data it holds, what its identity can reach, or whether an attacker could get there at all. Two organisations with the same scanner output can face different exposure. The work here adds that context: which findings sit on a path from the internet to something worth taking, and which are noise. In the estates we have seen, the second group is most of the list, and treating it as urgent is what exhausts the people who could have fixed the first.
From a backlog to a short list
Before, cloud security is a backlog: thousands of findings, ownership unclear, severity as the only sort order, and a quarterly argument about why the number has not come down. After, there is an inventory with owners, the estate's real attack paths named and closed, permissions cut back to what workloads use, guardrails in the pipeline so the fixes hold, and a board report that says what is exposed and what is being done. Remediation starts while the assessment is still running, because a path to a breach should not sit in a report for a month.
You already have the providers' security tools. Why is the estate still unclear?
Each provider secures its own platform well and shows you its own slice. The gap is between them, and between the categories: posture tooling sees configuration, vulnerability tooling sees software, identity tooling sees permissions, and none of them sees that a single workload is failing all three at once while facing the internet. Agent-based tools cover the servers someone installed them on and miss the containers, functions and appliances that make up more of the estate every year. And most findings land with the security team, who do not own the resource and cannot change it, so the fix becomes a ticket and the ticket becomes a backlog. The work on this page joins the views, puts each finding in front of the team that can fix it, and leaves you with far fewer things that are genuinely urgent.
Choosing tooling, without taking anyone's word for it
We are independent of any one platform, so here is the test we apply on your behalf, and which you should apply to us. Does it inventory the whole estate across providers and workload types by connecting to the cloud, or does it need software installed on every machine first. Does it join misconfiguration, vulnerability, identity, exposure and data into one view of risk, or hand you five queues. Does it validate that a path is exploitable from outside, or rank by a generic score. Can it check infrastructure code before deployment as well as the running estate. Does it route a fix, with the steps, to the team that owns the resource, or does everything land with security. Does it produce compliance evidence continuously as a by-product. And what will it cost your platform teams in friction, because a control that slows a deployment will be switched off by the second sprint. If a platform cannot answer those plainly in a demo against your own accounts, that is the answer.
See it, measure it, or prove it
Demo
A working walkthrough against a scenario like yours, run by the engineer who would deploy it, not a sales team.
- The capability shown end to end on realistic data
- Your questions answered by the people who implement it
- A plain view of what it would take to run in your environment
Cloud Risk Assessment
The size of the exposure, evidenced: what runs in your cloud estate, which findings join into a path to a breach, and who owns the fix.
- Maturity rating against a recognised framework
- Risk register with severity and likelihood
- Policy and control gap assessment
- Prioritised remediation plan
- Board-ready summary of exposure
Proof of value
Test the case before you scale it: one use case, one sponsor, a controlled environment and a fixed budget.
- Working pilot in a controlled environment
- Measured results against agreed success criteria
- Data, risk and governance findings
- Scale-up plan and cost estimate
- A scale, adapt or stop recommendation
Start with a conversation
Choose how you want to begin. A partner replies within one business day.
Before you enquire
Yes. Most of the exposure we find sits inside a single provider: excess permissions, public storage, and workloads nobody owns. Several providers make the inventory harder, but the combinations that lead to a breach exist in every estate.
No. We are independent of any one product, and this page names none. Where tooling helps we bring what suits your estate, show it working against your own accounts in the demo, and leave you free to license it yourself, through us, or not at all.
It should speed them up. Fixes arrive with the steps written for the owning team, guardrails in the pipeline stop the same mistake recurring, and the security backlog shrinks to the items that matter. A control that slows a deployment will be switched off, so we design around the pipeline rather than in front of it.
A maturity rating against a recognised framework, a risk register with severity and likelihood, a policy and control gap assessment, a prioritised remediation plan, and a board-ready summary of exposure. It is scoped to evidence the size of the problem and to say what to fix first.
It gives it a sort order. Scanning continues; what changes is that each finding carries the context of where the workload sits, what it holds and what it can reach, so the program works the short list first rather than the long one.
Closely. The data step here locates sensitive data inside the cloud estate and joins it to exposure and identity. If the wider data estate has never been mapped, the data security work on this site goes deeper, and we will say which to start with.
The same senior people throughout. A partner stays accountable from the first conversation to the outcome, alongside the engineers doing the remediation. Afterwards you can run the operating model yourself, or we can run it with you under a managed arrangement with agreed service levels and reporting.